We analyze the effect of a decision support tool designed to help physicians detect and correct medical "missteps". The data comes from a randomized trial of the technology on a population of commercial HMO patients. The key findings are that the new information technology lowers average charges by 6%. These savings were the result of reduced in-patient charges (and associated professional charges) for the most costly patients. The rate at which potential errors were resolved was generally higher in the study group than in the control group-suggesting that the reduction in costs may also be accompanied by an improvement in care quality.
Introduction
In 1987, Nobel Laureate Robert Solow famously remarked, "you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics." (Solow, 1987) , p. 36).
Solow's aphorism neatly summarized the state of knowledge in the late 1980's and early 1990s. Since that time, however, economists have been able to identify measurable economic effects of the revolution in information technology (IT). The emerging consensus from this research is that the effect of IT varies depending on the design of organizations and the nature of production processes. IT complements the work of people engaged in non-routine problem solving and communication while it substitutes for lower-skill tasks involving the sorts of explicit rules that are relatively easy to program into computers.
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Studying the effect of IT on work processes involving non-routine problem solving and communication is hard --in large part because the inherent complexity of these processes make it difficult to identify meaningful performance measures that are also directly related to specific IT innovations. The search for good performance indicators and cleanly demarcated innovations has moved economists away from the analysis of aggregate productivity and technology data towards more narrowly focused studies.
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The added institutional knowledge made possible by the limited scope of these studies also helps analysts address the selection problems created by the non-random distribution of new innovations across organizations and work places. For discussions of this perspective see (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003) ; (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000) , (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002) ; and (Levy and Murnane, 2004) . See for example (Athey and Stern, 2002) on IT and the delivery of emergency medical services; (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2002 )on banking; (Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2004 ) on computer controlled machines in manufacturing and (Hubbard, 2003) on capacity utilization in the trucking industry. 3 The econometric challenges involved in studying the effect of IT innovations closely parallel the issues involved in the study of innovations in human resource practices. For an illuminating discussion and review see (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003) and for an
In this paper, we also analyze the effects of an IT enabled innovation in a narrowly defined production process characterized by non-routine problem solving and communication. The information technology we study is a decision support tool designed to notify physicians about potential medical "errors" as well as deviations from evidence based clinical practice guidelines. Our approach is closest in spirit to Athey and Stern's (Athey and Stern, 2002 ) study of emergency medical services. Like Athey and Stern, we focus on the introduction of a discrete innovation that altered the handling of information in a health care setting and we assess the efficacy of the innovation by tracking health related outcomes. Our econometric approach, however, differs from theirs in that we use a randomized controlled trial to identify the effect of the new technology. 4 Although we focus on a specific production process, the results we report have broad implications for management and economic issues in health care. A large and influential body of research suggests that preventable medical errors have a substantial effect on the cost and quality of medical care. 5 In response to these findings, a number application to the health care setting see (Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor, 2004) .
4 (Athey and Stern, 2002) identify the effect of the technology in their study by comparing early and late adopters in a differences-in-differences framework. An obvious issue with this approach is that participants who choose to adopt early might be those for whom the benefits of the innovation are especially large. A randomized controlled trial eliminates this source of bias because the participants receiving the treatment are a random sample of the subject pool. Randomized trials have other limitations, however.
The subject pools are often small and may not be representative of the underlying population. This can bias estimates of the effect of the intervention on a population.
For a practical example of this sort of bias in a health care setting see (Duggan, 2005) . . This report concluded that at least 44,000
Americans die each year as a result of medical errors during hospitalization and some estimates suggest the number may be as high as 98,000. To date, very little is known about the incidence of errors in outpatient settings, but the incidence may be high (Lapetina and Armstrong, 2002 Although disease management programs have become a ubiquitous part of health care
and there is some evidence that they can be effective in reducing costs and improving quality (Shojania and Grimshaw, 2005; Gertler and Simcoe, 2004) , many of the studies
The data in this study comes from a randomized trial of a physician decision support technology introduced to a population of commercial HMO patients. As we discuss below, the design of the study allows for especially clean performance measures and strong causal inferences. The key findings are easily summarized. The new information technology reduces resource utilization while also improving care quality.
Average charges were 6% lower in the study group than in the control group. These savings were the result of reduced in-patient charges (and associated professional charges) for the most costly patients. The rate at which potential errors were resolved was generally higher in the study group than in the control group-suggesting an improvement in care quality.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section two describes the setting of the trial and the decision support technology. Section three presents the data analysis. Section four concludes and discusses new research questions raised by the study.
The Setting
Physician Mistakes:
Physicians make mistakes -and these mistakes are increasingly believed to have a substantial effect on the cost and quality of medical care. The causes of errors are not entirely clear, but a leading suspect is the volume and complexity of the information that physicians must process about their patients' medical conditions and the rapidly changing state of medical knowledge (Bohmer, 1998) ; (Institute Of Medicine Committee On Quality Of Health Care In America, 2001); (Landrigan, Rothschild et al., 2004) ).
If errors come from keeping abreast of "too much information", then it makes sense to look to information technology to help manage this burden. Ideally one would like to use IT to collect and analyze patient information and to communicate likely missteps to physicians. In order for these messages to be influential it is important that they be delivered in a timely fashion, be targeted to specific patients, and that they reliably inform physicians of overlooked issues or issues about which he or she lacked are poorly designed and few of them use evidence from randomized controlled trials of interventions (Shojania and Grimshaw, 2005 The participants selected for the study came from an HMO located in a Midwestern city. All were all under age 65 and had had some medical charges in the year prior to the experiment. Once selected, the participants were randomly allocated into study and control groups. The software was turned on for patients in the study group. This means that their physicians received CC's during the yearlong course of the experiment. The software was not turned on for patients in the control group until the experiment was over, but the billing, pharmacy and lab data of these patients was collected and saved. At the end of the year, the control group's medical data was analyzed to find CC's that would have appeared if the software had been running. An important feature of the study design was that randomization occurred at the level of the patient. This means that some physicians had patients in both the study and the control group. Thus lessons that physicians learned from receiving a CC for a study group patient might spillover to their control group patients. These spillovers could therefore have the effect of biasing the estimated impact of the decision support software downwards.
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More information about the design as well as a preliminary analysis of results can be found in (Javitt, Steinberg, Couch, Locke, Jacques, Juster and Reisman, 2005 however, it appears that some types of CCs were not sent because they duplicated advice in disease management programs already in place at the HMO. These were mostly level three CC's focused on preventative care. In addition, the nurse decided that some other CCs didn't make clinical sense.
Outcomes:
By comparing the study and the control groups, we can identify the effect of the error detecting software on "remediable" medical errors. Remediable errors occur when physicians are not fully aware of all the available information concerning their patients and /or the state of relevant medical knowledge. These errors are important because they might not have occurred if the physician had had timely access to the appropriate information.
The data collected in this study yields two natural performance measures: the rate at which problems identified by CC's are resolved; and the average costs of medical care. We discuss each of these in turn.
Resolution Rates: Physicians often have better information about their patients than does the error detecting software. Actions that look like a misstep to the computer may in fact be the result of informed physician choice and/or patient non-compliance.
For this reason, the HMO and the software company viewed CCs as recommendations that physicians were free to ignore if they disagreed. 11 In addition, some issues
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Informal conversations with physicians who attended a discussion group about the identified by the software would have been resolved even if no messages had been sent to physicians. Given these ambiguities, how should we interpret differences in resolution rates between study and control groups?
In answering this question it is helpful to consider a simple example. Imagine there is a clinical action recommended by the computer that a physician can either take or not take and that this action can have an effect on the patient that is either positive or not. Denote the probability that a physician with a patient in the study group will take this action and that the patient will benefit from this as s 11 and the probability that the physician will take this action and the patient will not benefit as s 10 . The corresponding probabilities for the control group are c 11 and c 10 . Resolution rates will appear higher in the study than the control group when s 11 + s 10 > c 11 + c 10 11 11 10 10
Similarly, quality for patients improves when s 11 + s 01 > c 11 + c 01 . A sufficient condition for both resolution rates and quality to improve in the study group is These two conditions are both intuitive and reasonable. The first, which might be called the useful information condition, states that higher resolution rates in the study group are the result of the computer messages persuading physicians to take actions that benefit their patients. The second, which might be called the physician judgment condition, states that physicians who correctly decide that no action is in the best interest of their patient will not change their mind when exposed to the computer messages. Thus if we assume that the computer supplies sufficiently useful information to physicians and if physician judgment is sufficiently good that the computer messages will not easily persuade them to alter treatment strategies in ways that harm their patients, then higher resolution rates in the study group are an indicator of improved care quality. Resolution rate differentials are, in this context, an ordinal rather than cardinal quality measure. We can infer that quality has improved, but we don't know by how much.
software indicated that they also viewed the care considerations as suggestions that they could disregard.
Average Costs: The CC's issued by the system recommended roughly three types of actions: "add a drug", "stop a drug" and "do a test". The first and the third of these entail a direct increase in the utilization of medical resources. If, however, these actions prevent subsequent costly complications, the net effect might be to reduce charges relative to the control group.
Administrative data from the HMO was collected on average charges per member per month in the year prior to the study and also during the year of the study. 12 By comparing average costs in the study and control groups over the year, we can estimate the costs of "remediable" medical errors. These cost estimates cover only a fraction of the total costs of errors. They do not include: the costs of lost work time and productivity; disability costs or the costs of personal care not paid for by insurers; or the costs of litigation resulting from errors. Clearly the charges tracked in this study understate the full social cost of medical mistakes.
It is also worth noting that the study is designed to assess only the short-run cost effects of the intervention. Many of the benefits of avoiding missteps likely appear years after the error occurred. Given the reportedly high rate of turnover among HMO patients, however, much of the financial incentive to act to prevent mistakes may be captured by the short-run savings identified in this study.
Data and Results
Descriptive Statistics Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The analysis does not include enrollees younger than age 11 because the decision support software had very few pediatric treatment guidelines in place at the time of the study. The number of individuals in the study and control groups older than age 12 in the year 2001 was 19716 and 19792 12 Charges are best understood as the "retail" price of health care….a price that no one actually pays. Charges are the standard measure of cost used in health care studies, but their relationship to economic costs is never very clear. In our setting, we will be looking at the difference in charges between study and control group members, and this may reduce some of the noise introduced by these very imperfect cost measures.
respectively. There is some attrition from the study in the year 2001, mostly because of the change of insurers that takes place at the beginning of each calendar/contract year.
In both the study and control groups, roughly 72% of respondents stayed in the sample for all 12 months.
Who Gets CCs? Taken together, the results in column (1) of Table 2 indicate that older, male patients with high medical charges in the previous year are more likely to have errors.
The findings are consistent with the notion that care complexity is an important determinant of physician missteps. As bodies age, more things are likely to go wrong --leading to more treatment and also more opportunities for lapses. Similarly, the more charges a patient generates, the greater the medical activity undertaken on their behalf.
Managing these activities creates additional opportunities for errors.
The models estimated in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 redo the analysis focusing respectively on the number of CCs received (a negative binomial model) and the severity of the most severe CC received (an ordered probit model). In both cases we find that older patients, male patients and patients with more charges prior to the experiment are likely to generate more, and more severe, CCs. These results are both statistically significant and large in magnitude. They further underscore the likely role that complexity of care plays in generating errors.
Cost Differentials Table 3 analyzes the effect of the intervention on average charges per member per month. We adopt an "intention to treat" approach and compare the average charges in the study group and the treatment group. There are many possible treatment mechanisms in this study and it is hard to appropriately identify them all.
As discussed above, we observe CCs generated by the software and approved by MD's working for the software company, but the HMO's nurse passed only a subset of these along to the treating physician. Similarly it is hard to know if the effect of the intervention was due to the information content of the particular CC or simply the fact that a physician received a CC at all. The "intention to treat" approach allows us to be agnostic about the mechanisms of action.
Column (1) in Table 3 The coefficient 69.099 means that average costs rose from the pre-study year to the study year by $69.10 pmpm. This increase is driven by two factors: the growth in medical prices from one year to the next and also the increase in medical services delivered as individuals become one year older. The key variable that identifies the average treatment effect is Study*Year = 2001. The coefficient reported implies that the increase in average costs from the pre-study year to the study year was $21.92 less in the study group than in the control group. Thus the intervention reduced the average of total charges in the study group by 6.1% of the average $352 pmpm control group charges. This difference is both economically significant and statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Columns (2)- (5) of Table 3 14 The results in Table 3 imply that in-patient and professional charges account for 95% of the total cost differential between study and control groups. In-patient charges arise from the use of hospital resources, but professional charges include services that can be delivered in either an inpatient or outpatient setting. Our findings suggest that the experiment did not reduce all professional charges, but only those associated with 13 (Gertler and Simcoe, 2004) report that a disease management program for diabetes reduced costs by about 8 percent in the first twelve months and larger cost savings were realized in subsequent quarters.
14 Examples of issues reported as CCs that were likely to prevent re-hospitalization include inadequate use of ACE inhibitors or beta-blockers for patients with myocardial infarctions or congestive heart failure.
hospitalization. Taking the coefficient on Study*Year =2001 in column (2) and dividing it by the analogous coefficient in column (5) we get 1.62. Thus every dollar decrease in professional charges that is due to being in the study group is associated with a $1.66 reduction in in-patient charges. Similar calculations using results from column (3) of Table 3 suggest that a dollar reduction in professional charges resulting from the experimental intervention is associated with a drop in outpatient charges of only $0.23.
The results in Table 3 indicate that the reduction in total charges is largely driven by inpatient costs and associated professional charges. Since hospitalization is expensive, this suggests that the cost-savings generated in the experiment are the result of reduced costs for high-cost participants. Table 4 examines this directly through the use of quantile regressions. Column (1) of Table 4 The finding that the "action" generated by the intervention primarily affects higher cost patients raises concerns about the appropriate way to calculate the tstatistics reported in Table 3 . Specifically one might be concerned about the assumption that the error term in our cost equations is normally distributed. For this reason we recalculated the t-statistics in Table 3 using a bootstrap technique that makes no assumptions about the functional form of the errors. As reported in the notes to Table 3 , we find that bootstrapped standard errors are quite close to the conventional standard errors generated by fixed effect estimators.
If the experimental intervention is the primary cause of the differences between study and control groups, one might expect the cost savings to be greatest for individuals with the highest propensity to generate CCs. Table 5 examines this issue by restricting our estimates to those individuals whose pre-study characteristics put them most at risk for producing an error message. Columns (1) through (5) of Table 5 examine charges for individuals who were over age 50 in the year prior to the experiment. This sample is of particular interest because the results in Table 2 indicate that this age group is most likely to generate error messages. In this table we use only data from the study year, so the key variable of interest is Study. 15 We find that the average total charges are $72.17 less in the study group than the control and this difference is rather precisely measured. As we observed in Table 3 , much of this differential was the result of differences in in-patient charges (study group members had in-patient charges that were nearly $50.00 lower than the control group with a tstatistic of 2.12.). Out-patient charges and Rx charges were not significantly different between the study and control group although the point estimate of magnitude of the out-patient differential ($9.59) is sizeable. Professional charges were, as before, estimated to be the second leading contributor to the differential between the study and control group differential, but the size of the professional charges differential was imprecisely measured and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the true effect was zero.
Restricting our sample to individuals over age 50 causes us to discard much of our data. An alternative approach, which we present in columns (6) through (10) is to use the "CC" equation in Table 2 to estimate each individual's propensity for receiving a CC based in pre-study characteristics. We can then weight each observation by its propensity score and, in this way, observe how our estimates change when greater weight is given to individuals likely -on the basis of pre-experiment characteristics --to be exposed to a care consideration message. As we observe in the notes to Table 3 , point estimates of the average treatment effect were very close whether we used a fixed effects model or restricted our attention to the study year differentials. 16 We set the analytical weight in STATA's regression command equal to the observation's propensity score. This weighting scheme assumes that observations with high propensities to generate CCs are measured more accurately than observations with low propensities. Specifically, analytical weights are assumed to be inversely proportional to the variance of an observation; i.e., the variance of the j-th observation is assumed to be In column (6) of Table 5 the coefficient on Study is -66.36, a cost differential in between study and control groups that is roughly three times the estimate in Table 3 .
Interestingly this number is not too far from the coefficient on Study in column (1) 17
This result confirms the impression from column (1) that cost savings from the study are greatest for individuals with a high propensity to receive a computer generated message. The weighted estimates for in-patient charges (columns (7)) and professional charges (column (10)) follow a similar pattern. The coefficients on variable Study in each of these cases is negative, statistically significant, and roughly three times the size of the effect observed in the un-weighted regressions in Table 3 . The results on outpatient and Rx charges follow the now familiar pattern: the coefficient on variable Study is small in magnitude and imprecisely measured. One cannot reject the hypothesis that the true effect of the intervention on outpatient and Rx charges is zero.
The overall impression from Table 5 is that the magnitude of the reductions in resource utilization in the study group are largest for those participants whose pre-study characteristics mark them as likely to be directly effected by the intervention.
Reverse Experiments:
The experiment was concluded at the end of December 2001, but the system was kept in place for study group members until the end of February 2002. At that time the entire software system was turned off. In June 2002 the software was started up again and CCs were sent to all HMO enrollees, including those in the original study and control groups. The general rollout of the system makes possible an additional test of the system's effects on costs. If the reduction in charges observed in the study group was indeed the result of the intervention, one should expect charges in the two groups to converge when the controls began receiving CCs. Table 6 compares charges in the study and control groups in the two years following the end of the experiment. Panel A of Table 6 analyzes cost data from calendar 2002. The coefficient on Study in column (1) indicates that average total charges in the study group were about $8.58 lower in the study than the control group.
This difference is about 40% of that observed in the year of the experiment and it is 17 The ninety five percent confidence interval is between -104.14 and -28.58.
imprecisely measured (t = 0.78) and not statistically distinct from 0. The corresponding coefficients for inpatient, outpatient, prescriptions and professional charges are presented in columns (2)-(4) respectively. They are similarly small, imprecisely measured, and not different from 0 at conventional significance levels. Column (6) is a probit where the dependent variable is 1 if a patient was ever hospitalized in the year and 0 otherwise. The probability of any hospitalization in 2002 was 0.5 percentage points lower in the study group than the control group (z=2.27). Column (7) is a quantile regression comparing the study and control groups at the 99 th percentile. The coefficient on Study is -238.91, slightly more than a third of the analogous coefficient in Table 4 and imprecisely measured (t=1.07). Panel B compares the remaining members of the study and control groups in the year 2003, two full years after the experiment.
We find no statistically significant difference in charges between the two groups in any component of costs. Taken together, the absence of cost differentials in years when the intervention was rolled out to both treatment and control groups supports the conclusion that the cost differentials observed during the study year were the result of the intervention. These findings also suggest that the effect that the intervention had on average charges was both fast-acting (appearing in the first year of the study) and also quickly dissipated.
Resolution Rates:
Assuming that physicians will not respond to computer generated recommendations unless they believe them to be in the interest of patients, higher resolution rates in the study group (relative to controls) indicate an improvement in the quality of care.
The recommendations issued by the software fell into three, not-quite mutually exclusive, categories: "add a drug", "do a test", and "stop a drug". To identify compliance with an "add a drug" recommendation, the computer scanned pharmacy records following the recommendation. If a prescription for the indicated drug was filled, the issue was declared resolved. Similarly, billing records were scanned following a "do a test" recommendation. If bills for the suggested test were sent, the recommendation was also declared to be resolved. An important limitation of the "add a drug" resolution measure is that the database does not record whether or not the patient in question actually took the drug after buying it. Calculating resolution rates for the "stop a drug" recommendations was more problematic than for the other two categories of suggestions. Individuals might have months-long supplies of the drug at home and the records only tell us that no new prescriptions for the drugs were filled.
To identify compliance with "stop a drug" recommendations, pharmacy records were scanned for 60-150 days after the CC was transmitted, and the issue was declared resolved if no new scripts for the indicated medication were filled in that time.
We know from casual conversations with physicians that the software sometimes generated inappropriate recommendations that were ignored by the physician. In addition some problems identified by the software would have been discovered and resolved by caregivers in the absence of computer-generated messages. For both these reasons an adequate assessment of the clinical efficacy of the decision support tool requires a comparison of the resolution rates in the treatment and the control groups. Tables 7 and 8 offer just such a comparison. We have identified four potential causes for excess CC's in the control group.
First, it is possible that the randomization didn't work in the sense that a larger proportion of individuals with characteristics that trigger CCs ended up in the control group than the study group. In discussion of Table 2 , we observed that CCs were more likely for older males with a history of high charges because these participants were more likely to have complicated, and hence more expensive, conditions. If more 18 The fraction of individuals receiving a CC is 20% higher in the control than the study group. A probit regressing the variable Any CC Generated against the variable Study finds that the difference between the study and control group is statistically significant at the 1% level.
expensive individuals were sorted into the control group one would expect to see evidence of this in the cost differentials between groups. In Table 3 , however, we report that the average cost differential between study and control groups is almost completely unchanged by the presence or absence of fixed, participant effects. This suggests that the randomization "worked" in the sense that inherently expensive patients were evenly distributed between the study and control groups.
A second possible cause of excess CCs in the control group might be that the decision support tool was having the effect of reducing potential CC triggers in the study group. One can imagine that a physician receiving a CC might initiate actions that prevent additional CCs from being triggered. The evidence is, however, inconsistent with this hypothesis. In Table 7 The fourth possibility is one that we believe to be the most important. We discovered in the course of our studies that the number of CCs generated by the software is quite sensitive to the information presented to the computer system at the moment in time when the program is run. During the course of the study, the computer system generated messages based on information available at the time the program was run-roughly every week. In contrast, the control group CCs were generated using information accumulated over the entire year of the experiment. This subtle difference in the handling of information appears to be sufficient to generate significant differences in the number of CCs in the study relative to the control group.
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The consequences of the third and fourth explanations for excess CCs for our analysis of resolution rates are hard to assess. Of the 101 distinct care considerations that the software could generate, we observe 90 types issued in the study group and 83 issued in the control group. What we would like to know is whether the mix of CCs in the control group were more or less likely to resolve spontaneously than the mix of CCs in the study group. If, for example, the clinical conditions associated with excess CCs in the control group were such that they were intrinsically easier to spot and resolve than other CCs generated by the system, then our comparisons of resolution rates in the study and control group would understate the improvements in resolution rates due to the experiment. Conversely, the effect of the experiment on resolution rates would be biased upwards if the excess CCs in the control group were dominated by issues less likely to be resolved spontaneously. Of course, if the mix of control group CCs were the same as the mix generated for the study group, then our estimates of the intervention's effect on resolution rates would be unbiased. Unfortunately we have no way of assessing the spontaneous resolution rates of different CCs and hence we have no way of assessing the sign or magnitude of potential biases. One might suppose that very serious errors are more likely to be picked up by care providers because of other preexisting safety measures and this might provide some hint about the direction of biases.
The breakdown of CCs by severity level in Table 7 suggest that there are more severe
In another randomized trial using this software, we found excess CCs in the study group rather the control group. By forcing the computer system to generate simulated CCs for the study and control groups using data collected prior to the experiment we were able to achieve balanced outcomes. For technical reasons, it is not possible to construct such simulated CCs for this experiment. The analysis of this second randomized trial is currently in process.
CCs in the study than in the control group, but the number of such serious issues are very small and are therefore unlikely to be driving the results.
We can control for some of the potential differences in the mix of CCs between study and control groups by examining resolution rate differentials by type of CC. The results of this comparison can be found in the probits presented in Table 8 . In equation
(1) we observe that resolution rate for "Add a Drug" CCs is 8.6 percentage points higher in the study group than the control group. This is a 48% improvement over the control group. In column (2) we observe that resolution rates for "Do a Test" CC's are 5.8% higher in the study group, an improvement of 19% over the control group. We do not, however, observe higher resolution rates in the study group for "Stop a Drug" CCs.
The coefficient on Study in column (3) has the wrong sign, but is also imprecisely measured.
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We do not know why there appears to be no effect of CCs on "stop a drug" resolution rates and substantial effects on "add a drug" and "take a test" resolution rates. One plausible explanation is that many of the drug-drug inter-actions that trigger "stop a drug" CCs are also caught by pharmaceutical databases used by major pharmacies. If this were true, the computer system would not be providing much additional information about "stop a drug" issues to the study group.
To sum up, we find evidence that the messages sent to the doctors by the computer system increased the rate at which issues identified were resolved. The presence of excess CCs in the control group and the differences in the mix of CCs across the study and the control group raise the possibility that these estimates may contain some bias, but we do not know the sign or the magnitude of this bias. It is important to note, however, that the presence of excess CCs in the control group is not relevant for our estimates of differentials in resource utilization. These latter, In evaluating these resolution rate improvements, it is important to observe that it is hardly automatic that physicians respond to interventions in a positive way. (Shojania and Grimshaw, 2005) report in their assessment of quality improvement studies that interventions targeting provider behavior typically produce only modest improvements in compliance with care guidelines and the variation in results across studies is often large.
estimates compare average charges in the study and control groups and do not rely upon the identification of individuals who received CCs.
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Conclusions
This paper analyses the effect of a decision support tool designed to help physicians detect and correct medical "errors". Research suggests that physician errors have a substantial effect on the cost and quality of medical care, and a number of highprofile public and private initiatives are premised on the notion that new information technologies can reduce the incidence of errors. Economic studies of the efficacy of these technological fixes have, however, been scarce.
The data in this study comes from a randomized trial of the new technology in a population of commercial HMO patients. The primary findings of the study are that average charges were 6% lower in the study group than in the control group. These savings were the result of reduced in-patient charges (and associated professional charges) for the most costly patients. Patients with the greatest propensity to trigger the computer messages were the most expensive and also the most likely to experience a reduction in charges over the course of the experiment. Consistent with these results, we also observed that when the experiment was ended and the computer system was rolled out to all HMO members, the cost differential between the study and control group rapidly disappeared.
Comparison of the rate at which issues were resolved between study and control groups was complicated by the way in which the control group data was handled. We found, however, that the resolution rate was generally higher in the study group than in the control group-suggesting an improvement in care quality.
We conclude by assessing the limitations of the experiment and suggesting avenues for future research. One important limitation is the study's short duration.
To the extent that some of the benefits of correcting missteps spill over into future 21 The estimates of the propensity to generate CCs that we used in Table 5 used only the actual CCs issued to the study group and hence were not influenced by the process of CC generation in the control group.
years, our analysis understates the cost saving potential of the physician decision support system. 22 A similar bias may result from physicians having patients in both the treatment and control groups. If lessons learned from patients in the study group spill over to the treatment of patients in the control group, our estimates of the interventions effect will be further understated.
A second limitation is that the study was conducted on a commercial insurance population where everyone was less than sixty-five years old. Since the likelihood of errors increases dramatically with age, much of the impact of this new technology will be found in older age groups not included in this study.
In future work we will analyze a similar trial conducted for Medicare populations aged sixty-five and older.
A final issue left unresolved by this study is the mechanism by which care considerations influence outcomes. Specifically, the analysis does not identify the lessons physicians learned from the messages they received. It is possible that physicians learned only that the patient named in the care consideration required additional attention. Alternatively, it might be that the specific clinical content of the care considerations sometimes imparted new and useful information to the physician.
This latter possibility suggests that widespread implementation of computer based decision support systems may increase the dynamic efficiency of the health care system by increasing the rate at which new knowledge is diffused. Understanding the effect of IT based decision support tools on the diffusion of new medical knowledge will be the subject of future investigations.
Looking beyond medical costs and care quality, this study also adds to the growing body of research documenting the multifarious ways that the information technology revolution complements work involving non-routine problem solving and communication. Specifically IT enabled support tools can improve the economic efficiency of decisions made by highly trained professionals making complex decisions in challenging environments.
22 (Gertler and Simcoe, 2004) find that cost improvements in a diabetes disease management program became apparent only after the first six months of the intervention and that most cost savings occurred beyond the first year. Column (1) is a probit with coefficients expressed as derivatives. For dummy variables this is a discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables the derivative is evaluated at the mean. Column (2) is a negative binomial count model of the number of CCs received. Parameter α = 4.02. The coefficients are expressed as incident rate ratios so that the number of cc's for those 20-30 is 3.742 times that of the omitted age group. Colum (3) is an ordered probit of an indicator of cc severity. CC's were ranked from least (3) to most (1) dangerous. Those with no CCs were given a 4. Members were assigned the level of the most dangerous CC they recieved.
The omitted age category is teenagers between 12 and 20.
Numbers in ( ) are z scores Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses # significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The absolute value of bootstrapped z-scores for Study*Year in columns (1)-(6) are respectively: (-1.85), ( -1.83 ), (-0.58 ), ( 0.84 ), (-2.42), (-0.10). These were calculated by sampling, with replacement, 100 times for each equation.
Similar results were found if we estimated the model using only study year data. For columns 1-5 the coefficients (t-statistics) for Study*year are: -24.777 (2.44), -13.906 (2.38), -2.423 (0.82), -.057 (0.04), -8.390 (-2.24) Bootstrapped standard errors were very close to OLS in these models F tests that individual fixed effects are jointly zero can be rejected at 1 percent significance levels. Quantile regressions estimated for the median, 90th and 99th percentiles respectively. The standard errors for these regressions were bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions The R-squared for the quantile regressions are pseudo R-squared. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
In columns (1)-(5), the absolute value of the bootstrapped z scores for variable Study are respectively (2.14), (2.17), (1.06), (0.13), (1.07) The standard errors for all bootstrapped estimates involved sampling, with replacement, 100 times.
For the weighted regressions in (6)-(10), we set the analytical weight in STATA's regression command equal to the observation's propensity score, i.e. the predicted probability from equation (1) in Table 2 that an individual will generate a CC. This weighting scheme assumes that observations with high propensities to generate CCs are measured more accurately than observations with low propensities. Specifically, analytical weights are assumed to be inversely proportional to the variance of an observation; i.e., the variance of the j-th observation is assumed to be σ/ωj where the weights, ωj, are rescaled to sum to the number of observations in the data. Robust t statistics in parentheses in columns (1)-(5) and (7). Column (6) presents z statstics. The standard errors for the quantile regressions were calculated by bootstrapping 100 times with replacement. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The experiment concluded at the end of December 2001, but the "care engine" remained on for two months At the end of February, the entire system was "turned off" and in June the system was rolled out to all members. Panel A compares charges in the study and control group during the study year, 2001. Panels B and C compare study and control groups in 2002 and 2003, after the experiment was rolled out to all members. .
